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ANTITRUST EXEMPTION DENIED FOR HEALTH
PLANNING REGULATIONS
Antitrust laws' serve the public interest by promoting competition2
through free trade-a fundamental American economic policy.3 In
contrast, federal regulations often seek to correct market inefficien-
cies by controlling economic activity within specific industries.4 To
reconcile this conflict, Congress and the courts have created a series
of antitrust exemptions.5 These exemptions permit a regulated indus-
I. The principal antitrust statutes are the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act contain the relevant operational language.
Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony...
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. The basic purpose of antitrust laws, the promotion of competition, relies on the
theory that markets perform most efficiently in a competitive environment. For a
detailed description of the economics of antitrust, see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 104-13 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST §§ 5-8 (1977). See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976). For a critical economic analysis of the impact of antitrust laws
on consumer welfare, see generally R. BoRKc, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
3. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-99
(1978) (Congress, in creating the Sherman Act, sought to establish a regime of compe-
tition as the fundamental principle governing commerce); Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966) (the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy), See
cases cited note 25 infra.
4. Adams, Exemptionsfrom Antitrust, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST POLICY
274 (A. Phillips ed. 1965) (this article criticizes the economic effectiveness of antitrust
laws, and of antitrust exemptions in particular).
5. Congress created particular antitrust exemptions for agricultural and
fishermen's cooperatives, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); labor unions, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976);
export associations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976); small businesses, 15 U.S.C. § 638
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(1976); newspapers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976); banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1828c (1976);
and professional sports, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). These special provisions may alter
or entirely replace the normal scope of antitrust laws in each situation, P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 133-231.
In addition, provisions of Title 15 expressly grant antitrust immunity to certain
regulated industries. For example, transactions authorized by the following agencies
are exempt from antitrust scrutiny for activities under 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976): Civil
Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Power Commis-
sion, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission.
See also note 29 infra.
When federal regulatory acts include no specific provisions for immunity, the
courts have created particular exemptions on the basis of implied immunity. See note
30 and accompanying text infra.
Other exemptions apply when antitrust laws conflict with state laws regulating busi-
ness affairs. The state action exemption, first addressed in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), places great weight on state sovereignty where state regulations inhibit
competition. The Supreme Court in Parker held that the Sherman Act does not apply
when the state acts as a sovereign within the traditional limits of the state police
power. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 731-35. The courts have narrowed the state
action doctrine in a series of recent cases. See City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana
Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (municipal utility operators subject to anti-
trust liability); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising
not subject to antitrust laws); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state-
approved electric utility tariff subject to antitrust laws); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (lawyers' minimum fee schedule subject to antitrust liabil-
ity).
The court in Huron Valley Hospital v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) applied the state action exemption to health planning regulations. For a
discussion of Huron, see notes 28 and 97 infra. For information about the state action
exemption applied to the health industry, see Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Profes-
sional Discoline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443, 445-49; Walbolt & Pankau, Anti-
trust, Public Health-Care Institutions, and the Developing Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
385, 392-98. For general information on the state action doctrine, see Note, Parker v.
Brown Revisited The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977); Comment, StateAction Antitrust Exemption as Applied to
Public Utility Regulation: Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 20
URBAN L. Am. 289, 294-99 (1980).
Another exemption, the Noerr doctrine, protects actions aimed at influencing pub-
lic officials from antitrust scrutiny. The doctrine applies to situations in which private
parties attempt to persuade government actions against their competitors. L. SULLI-
VAN, supra note 2, at 740-43. The three cases which shaped this doctrine are Califor-
nia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (attempts to
prevent competitors from gaining access to agencies and courts came within the Noerr
"sham" exception and violated antitrust laws); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965) (union conspiracy to destroy small mining businesses exempt
from antitrust laws); Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (railroads releasing publicity harmful to trucking industry
exempt from antitrust laws). For a discussion of the Noerr doctrine in relation to
health planning, see Miller, Antitrust and Certificate of ANeed: Health Systems Agen-
cies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 GEO. L.J. 873, 900-17 (1980). For
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try's economic and policy objectives6 to supersede the goals of com-
petition. In the context of the health industry, Congress chose to
regulate the maldistribution of new hospital construction.' These
medical facilities are often oversupplied to urban areas. 8 In National
Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas
City,9 the Supreme Court found that this scheme of health planning
regulations provided an insufficient basis for antitrust immunity. 10
National Gerimedical," a private hospital, applied for member-
ship in Blue Cross" 2 participating-hospital program while its facility
was under construction.13 Hospitals in the program receive 100% re-
imbursement for their patients' Blue Cross insurance benefits. 4 Blue
Cross would not admit new hospitals into the program without prior
certification of need' 5 from the local health planning agency, Mid-
more information on the application of antitrust exemptions to the health industrty,
see notes 27, 28, and 97 infra.
6. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
7. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7842, 7879. In 1974, Congress estimated that by 1975, there would be
over 67,000 excess hospital beds in the United States. These unneeded beds contrib-
uted to the increasing costs of medical care. Id.
8. Id.
"Widespread access and distribution problems exist with respect to medical facil-
ities and services. In many urban areas, hospitals, clinics and other medical care
institutions and services are crowded into relatively tiny sectors, while large areas
go poorly served or completely unserved. Many rural communities are com-
pletely without a physician or any other type of health care service, while adja-
cent urban areas are oversupplied."
Id.
9. 101 S. Ct. 2415 (1981).
10. Id. at 2424.
I I. National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center, Id.
12. Blue Cross of Kansas City, Missouri, Id. at 2416. For the history of Blue
Cross and its relationship to health planning, see Payton and Powsner, Regulation
Through the Looking Glass. Hospitals, Blue Cross and Certfficate of Need, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 203 (1980).
13. 101 S. Ct. at 2417.
14. National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 479 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (W.D. Mo. 1979). Blue Cross pays only 80% of
the covered hospital costs of subscribers in hospitals not participating in this agree-
ment. Blue Cross reimburses the subscriber, and not the hospital. Id. See generally
S. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1974).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2417. Blue Cross issued a policy in 1976, requiring applicants to
demonstrate that their hospital met "a clearly evident need for health services in its
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
America Health Systems Agency, Inc. (MAHSA).' 6 Blue Cross re-
jected the National Gerimedical application because the hospital had
not obtained MAHSA approval.' 7 National Gerimedical alleged
that by conditioning participating-hospital status on prior MAHSA
approval, Blue Cross violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. 8 Claiming implied antitrust immunity, Blue Cross con-
tended that its policy promoted the congressional intent regarding the
MAHSA as embodied in the National Health Planning and Re-
sources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA).19 The Supreme
defined service area." 479 F. Supp. at 1016 (citing plaintiffs complaint, paragraph
18).
The Blue Cross policy considers the following factors:
The hospital must meet a clearly evident need for health care services in its de-
fined service area. Health care institutions and institutional services shall be ap-
proved, and/or if required by law, certified as necessary, by the designated
planning agency or areawide health planning agency respectively; or, when effec-
tive, by the designated State Agency as provided for in Public Law 93-641, the
'National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974,'
101 S. Ct. at 2417 n.3.
16. Id. at 2418. The Blue Cross policy required that MAHSA certify the need for
the facility. MAHSA is a non-profit private corporation. 479 F. Supp. at 1016 (citing
plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 6 and 18(a)). It fulfills the role of a Health Systems
Agency (HSA) under the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
(NHPRDA) of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976) as amended by Health Planning
and Health Services Research and Statistics Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-63, §§ 102,
103, 106, 91 Stat. 383-86; and Act of Dec. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-215, § 6, 91 Stat.
1507; and Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592.
In states adopting the 1974 health planning programs, see note 19 infra, all newly
proposed hospital facilities, major capital expenditures and major alterations in bed
capacity require prior approval of the State Health Planning and Development
Agency (SHPDA). The NHPRDA requires the SHPDA to consider the HSA's rec-
ommendations on these matters in making its final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-
2(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979). See generally CHAYET & SONNENRICH, P.C., CERTIFICATE
OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY CONCEPT (1978) for a description of health
planning regulations in each state.
Blue Cross and any other private third party insurers have no required or implied
relationship with the HSA. Private insurers usually have representatives on the HSA
governing board, but their involvement in any other manner has no relevance to the
designated planning functions. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3)(B) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2418. National Gerimedical could not obtain MAHSA approval.
MAHSA announced that it would not approve any more acute-care hospital facilities
in the Kansas City area. Therefore, National Gerimedical did not apply for certifica-
tion of need. Id.
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976) as amended by Health Planning & Health Serv-
ices Research and Statistics Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-63, §§ 102, 103, 106, 91 Stat.
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Court decided that Congress did not intend insurance companies to
enforce the statute.20 Consequently, Blue Cross enjoyed no antitrust
immunity.2' In a unanimous decision reversing the district22 and cir-
383-86; and Act of Dec. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-215, § 6, 91 Stat. 1507; and Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93
Stat. 592. NHPRDA focused on the health industry's nationwide problems. Con-
gress' primary objectives for the program included improving health care, containing
costs, and preserving competition within the industry. The Act created a complex
network of agencies at three levels designed to implement the objectives. Briefly, the
Act called for a State Health Coordinating Council (SHCC) in each state, linked di-
rectly to the federal agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (then the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare). The SHCC reviews and coordinates
activities at the state and local levels of the planning network. At the second level, the
State Health Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDA) develop the preliminary
health strategies for the state and regulate the certificate-of-need program. Finally, at
the community level, NHPRDA established the Health Systems Agency (HSA),
which has the most direct involvement with the health practitioners and the planning
process. In addition, it has the power to review use of federal funds in its area and to
make recommendations regarding certificate-of-need applications. Although directly
involved in the planning process, HSAs have no independent regulatory authority.
For a discussion of the health planning network established by NHPRDA, see Blum-
stein and Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through Cerificate of Need An
Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3-14; Cain, Health Planning in the United'States. The
1980s-A Protagonists View, 6 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 159, 160-62 (1981);
Hammer, The Review of Institutional Health Services. The Role and Liability of the
Health Systems Agency Governing Body, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 59, 59-68; Note, The
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act and State Action: A Reap-
praisal of the Role of Private Health Care Institutions, 57 B.U.L. REv. 511, 515-17
(1977) [hereinafter cited as National Health Planning].
The certificate-of-need program actually originated in the 1960's. It initially in-
volved state regulation of capital expenditures for new and existing hospital facilities.
It attempted to control costs, Lewin, Somers & Somers, State Health Cost Regulation:
Structure and Administration, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 654-55 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Lewin], and help solve the severe maldistribution of health services with voluntary
cooperation from members of the health field. See Havighurst, Regulation ofHealth
Facilities and Services by "Certofcate of Need", 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1143-51 (1973).
The NHPRDA incorporated the certificate-of-need program into its tri-level system
of health planning. See Schonbrun, Making Certficate of Need Work, 57 N.C.L.
REV. 1259, 1263-66, 1272-74 (1979). See generally C. HAVIGHURST, REGULATING
HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION (1974).
At the time that Natiohal Gerimedical applied to Blue Cross, the Missouri SHPDA,
which administers the certificate-of-need program, had not been established. Mis-
souri eventually established the program. Mo. REV. STAT. § 197. 300 et. seq. (Supp.
IV 1980). Had these regulations been activated at the time of the suit, this case might
never have arisen. 101 S. Ct. at 2422 n.15.
20. 101 S. Ct. at 2422.
21. Id. at 2424.
22. National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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cuit2 3 courts, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of National
Gerimedical.24
Courts consistently view the antitrust law as a basic doctrine of
economic freedom.25 This philosophy tends to conffict with numer-
ous congressional decisions to regulate entry and competitive conduct
generally in particular industries.26 Both Congress and the courts
create antitrust exemptions for these industries when they determine
that preservation of the regulatory policy2 7 outweighs a policy favor-
23. National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City, 628 F. 2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980).
24. 101 S. Ct. at 2424.
25. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (antitrust laws as
the Magna Carta of free enterprise); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (Sherman Act is the charter of economic liberty).
The history of antitrust legislation reveals an unclear and often conflicting set of
underlying priorities and interests throughout the development of the doctrine. Since
its inception in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act has caused continuous conflicts. Its
vague wording does not articulate precise legislative goals. R. SHERMAN, ANTITRUST
POLICIES AND ISSUES ix (1978). Such uncertainties have compelled the courts to take
a major role in shaping the law. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 15.
For a concise history of the origins of antitrust law, see A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE
ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14-23 (3d ed. 1980).
26. For examples of Congressional concerns reflected in regulatory legislation, see
note 27 infra. Examples of regulated industries include: public utilities (Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission); communications (Federal Communications Commis-
sion); transportation (Federal Maritime Commission; Civil Aeronautics Board);
commerce (Interstate Commerce Commission); securities (Securites and Exchange
Commission).
27. In the regulation of public utilities, for example, antitrust immunity ensures
that the regulations can effectively control prices and profits. Immunity thereby pro-
motes efficiency and innovation-goals not achievable under normal competitive cir-
cumstances. In the airline industry, the regulations attempted to promote the industry
by setting rates to direct profits from the major markets to smaller markets. In regu-
lating the shipping industry, Congress wanted to prevent the formation of mergers
and agreements benefiting only the wealthiest merchants. See P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 2, at 138. See also Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to
Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV. 1, 43-54 (1976).
Federal regulations controlling the health industry involve issues of maldistribution
of health services, as well as rising costs of health care. Regulations in the health
industry address a number of unique factors. Not only are health care costs rising at
four times the rate of inflation, M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER 26 (1979), but the industry's regulations attempt to compensate for the
system's inefficiencies rather than correct them. S. HARRIS, THE ECONOMICS OF
HEALTH CARE 4 (1975). See also M. THOMPSON, supra, at 19, citing COOPERS &
LYBRAND, LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO HOSPITALS (1978), describing the health industry as
"the most highly regulated 'unregulated industry' in the country."
Additionally, the health care providers wield significant power in shaping health
[Vol, 23:325
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ing competition.2" These exemptions may arise through explicit stat-
utory language.29 On the other hand, when the regulatory legislation
policies, while the public remains largely unable to influence or change the system.
For example, the health industry's concept of "need" changes according to the availa-
bility of certain services. Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-
Offs in Medical Care.- The Role of FSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 28 (1975). This
phenomenon has caused the public to demand only the highest quality medical care
at any cost. See Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 252, 259 (1970). All of these factors have provided no
encouragement for cost containment in the health industry. Thus analysts have char-
acterized the industry as unresponsive to classic market forces. Lewin, supra note 19,
at 651.
The health industry has only recently become a subject of antitrust scrutiny. Until
1975, members of the health industry found broad protection in the learned profes-
sions exemption. The courts based the exemption on the idea that professional activ-
ity should not be treated as "trade or commerce" within the Sherman Act. Grad,
supra note 5, at 451. The Supreme Court essentially destroyed that exemption in
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), by saying that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act. . . ." Id. at 787 (1975).
See Walbolt and Pankau, supra note 5, at 385. For further discussion of the learned
professions exemption, see Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry: New
Warriors Into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446, 453-56 (1979).
28. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975).
"[W]e have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that the
federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could carry out that
responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced
by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws." Id. Securities Dealers re-
lied on Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (narrowly
defined immunity to antitrust laws permissible if consistent with public interest) and
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (when a
statute does not provide explicit exceptions to antitrust laws, it may, in certain in-
stances, grant immunity by implication when this would be consistent with the public
interest).
The court first dealt with antitrust claims against an HSA in Huron Valley Hospital
v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In Huron the local HSA
refused to grant a certificate-of-need to plaintiff, an organization attempting to build a
new hospital. This action involved a question of state action since the conflict con-
cerned Michigan's health planning regulations. 466 F. Supp. at 1304. Cf. note 19.
Nevertheless, the Court's evaluation of the NHPRDA legislation indicated that Con-
gress intended to confer some antitrust immunity for activities related to state health
planning. 466 F. Supp. at 1312. But see note 97 infra.
29. Examples of specific statutory exemptions include: Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Interstate Commerce Act of
1976, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10780 (Supp. III 1979); Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-
842 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 5 supra. Although Congress created specific
provisions defining an agency's required compliance with antitrust laws, the actual
extent of the express immunity only crystallizes when a challenge to that authority
occurs. See Shuman, supra note 27, at 17-21.
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lacks specific language concerning antitrust exemptions, courts con-
sider whether Congress implied antitrust immunity.
30
Courts very reluctantly, 31 and often inconsistently, 32 confer im-
plied immunity on regulated industries. Courts undertake a two-step
approach in determining if Congress intended antitrust immunity to
apply in a particular instance. The courts first look for evidence of a
direct conflict between the regulatory statute and antitrust laws.33
30. This concept, termed the doctrine of implied immunity, surfaced for the first
time in Keogh v. Chicago Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Plaintiff challenged
railroad rate-fixing as a violation of the Sherman Act. The Court, in denying plain-
tif's claim, preserved the congressional intent of the railroad's regulatory agency-the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The Court found that the claim was
"barred by implication" because the ICC, acting within the scope of its authority,
approved the rates. This case, for the first time, demonstrated the Court's ability to
promote these governmental policies through implied immunity. See Note, Antirust
and Regulated Industries: A Critique and Proposalfor Reform of the Implied Immunity
Doctrine, 57 TEx. L. REv. 751, 757-60 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust and Regu-
lated Industries].
31. The cases contain two major propositions reflecting this reluctance to confer
implied immunity. The first proposition states that antitrust immunity is not lightly
implied. For cases citing this proposition, see Radzanower v. Touche Ross and Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S.
164, 168 (1976); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368
(1967) United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
The second proposition states that the cardinal principle of construction is that re-
peals by implication are not favored. For cases citing this proposition, see Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); California v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939).
Based on these antitrust cases, other courts have adopted a similar reluctance to
construe federal statutes in a manner which repeals other federal statutes. See Ten-
nessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978) (Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 550 (1974) (Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-495 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
32. In situations of antitrust conflict, courts strive to preserve both the antitrust
laws and the pertinent statute. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 at
357. Application of this principle results in inconsistent decisions because the courts
base their analyses on different factors. Some courts choose to examine legislative
histories. Others put more weight on statutory construction. Still others look to the
pattern of previous judicial interpretations in that industry. The courts may utilize
one or more of these elements in deciding on implied immunity. See Antitrust & Reg-
ulated Industries, supra note 30, at 761-62, for a detailed critique of the inconsistent
use of such factors. See also Shuman, supra note 27, at 25-28.
33. While this Comment utilizes a 2-step analysis to summarize the courts' treat-
ment of implied antitrust immunity, all courts have not necessarily followed these
steps in this particular manner or order. See note 32 supra which illustrates the judi-
cial inconsistencies.
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Finding this element requires a showing of clear repugnancy 34 be-
tween the statute and antitrust laws. 35 The court must also demon-
strate that in order to achieve its stated purpose, the statute requires a
construction conferring immunity.36 Under the second step,37 courts
examine the nature and pervasiveness of the regulatory power dele-
gated to the agency.38 The existence of agency authority to merely
consider antitrust consequences does not provide a sufficient basis for
immunity.39 The courts will analyze the specific authority delegated
and its exercise in the particular instance.
The Supreme Court established these two elements of the implied
immunity analysis in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.4 Plaintiff,
34. A repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the relevant statute occurs when
application of the antitrust laws would "render nugatory" the provisions of the statute
relevant to the alleged violation. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659,
691 (1975). See also United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939) (citing
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936)).
35. Id.
36. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). For
a discussion of this case, see notes 72-77 and accompanying text infra. In Federal
Maritime Comm'n (FMC) v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973), the Supreme
Court denied antitrust immunity for agreements made between shipping merchants,
even though the FMC has the power under the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 801-842 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) to exempt certain shipping agreements from anti-
trust scrutiny. The Court found this particular agreement beyond the scope of the
FMC's regulatory power and did not grant immunity. Id. at 733.
In United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), the Court with-
held implied immunity because the application of the antitrust laws posed no barrier
to accomplishing the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) mandate. Id. at
347-52.
See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1975). For a
discussion of Gordon, see notes 60-71 and accompanying text infra.
37. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
38. For cases citing this proposition, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 410
U.S. 366, 374 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346-48
(1963); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05
(1963).
39. For cases citing this proposition see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 352 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 486
(1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959).
40. United States v. A.T. & T., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1323 (D.D.C. 1978) (existence
of FCC regulations alone will not immunize telecommunications corporation from
antitrust scrutiny). See Antitrust & Regulated Industries, supra note 30, at 775-76. See
also United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 72-77 and accompanying text infra.
41. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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a registered non-member of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE)4' alleged that defendants, Exchange members, prevented
him from competing with registered members43 in violation of the
Sherman Act." Silver contended that by disconnecting his wire serv-
ice to the Exchange, defendants caused his business to suffer.4 . The
Exchange and its members replied, claiming immunity from the anti-
trust laws because of the pervasive regulatory scheme administered
over the NYSE by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).46
In finding for Silver, the Supreme Court first held that implied im-
munity can result only where the statute would otherwise create re-
pugnancy to the antitrust laws.47 Second, the Court ruled that the
proper administration of the statute must require this construction. 8
Although the Court failed to state explicitly how this rule should ap-
ply in other contexts, it found the SEC could accomplish its general
regulatory purposes without a finding of immunity.49 The Court also
found that while the SEC has broad regulatory power over securities
transactions, the statute failed to authorize the agency to deal with a
group boycott as alleged in Silver."0 The Court, therefore, would not
sustain implied immunity under the aegis of SEC authority.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court applied Silver's two-part analy-
sis in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.51 The Court relied on
Silver in finding direct conflict between antitrust laws and the regula-
tory statute." Otter Tail departed significantly, however, from Sil-
ver's analysis of regulatory power. Otter Tail, a local power
company, had the sole ability to transmit power throughout a region
42. Id. at 343. Plaintiff had the status of a registered securities broker even
though he sold securities as an independent dealer (not a NYSE member). Id.
43. Id. at 343-45. Plaintiffs profitable business depended upon constant contact
through his wire service with major NYSE member firms, non-member firms and
banks. When plaintiff no longer had the ability to make these rapid contacts, he
could not compete with other securities dealers. Id.
44. Id. at 345. Plaintiff alleged that the group-denial of his wire service by the
NYSE member firms constituted aper se violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id. at 347.
47. Id. at 358.
48. Id. at 357.
49. Id. at 358.
50. Id. at 357, 360.
51. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
52. Id. at 372.
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of the midwestern United States." The Federal Power Act (FPA)54
encouraged, but did not require, voluntary interconnections between
neighboring power facilities." Nevertheless, Otter Tail refused to
sell electricity to its potential competitors. 6 The Government alleged
that Otter Tail violated the Sherman Act by monopolizing the sale of
electricity in the area. 7 In light of the FPA statute, the Court denied
antitrust immunity because Otter Tail's exclusion of the neighboring
municipalities arose from a business judgment rather than from regu-
latory coercion. 8 The Court found such independent decision-mak-
ing entirely beyond the scope of the regulatory scheme.5 9
The Supreme Court clarified the original Silver principles in
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange.6" Plaintiff asserted that the
defendant-Exchange 61 violated the antitrust laws62 by fixing commis-
sion rates.63 Analysis of the legislative history revealed a direct con-
53. Id. at 370.
54. Ch. 687, § 202(b), 49 Stat. 848 (1920) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(b)
(1976)).
55. 410 U.S. 366, 375-76 n.7 (1973). Cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976). Cantor involved the voluntary activity of a local power company regu-
lated by state laws. The power company, Detroit Edison, distributed free, new light
bulbs in exchange for used light bulbs. Retail sellers claimed that this distribution
damaged their business. The state regulations incorporated this practice into the
power company's rate tariff. The Court denied the power company's antitrust exemp-
tion. The Court held that although the power company's voluntary activity fell
within a regulatory agency's jurisdiction, and that although a regulatory agency with
clear regulatory authority specifically approved, encouraged or authorized the act,
these facts did not automatically relieve the power company of antitrust liability. Id.
at 598.
56. 410 U.S. 366, 371 (1973).
57. Id. at 368.
58. Id. at 374.
59. Id. The presence of regulatory pressure to perform the challenged activities
may protect an otherwiseper se violation of the antitrust laws from antitrust scrutiny.
However, an agency's general jurisdiction alone will not support a finding of immu-
nity. Id. at 372-73.
60. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
61. Id. Plaintiffs, a class of small investors, fied this suit against the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and two member firms. Id. at 660-61.
62. Id. at 661.
63. Id. at 666. The Court indicated that fixed-commission rates have existed in
the New York Stock Exchange since 1792. Id. at 663. The rates provide that Stock
Exchange members will not sell stock below a certain percentage of commission. The
Court's analysis relied, in part, on a history of the SEC's activity concerning fixed
commission rates, It found that although the SEC's specific rate regulatory power
19821
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ffict between the SEC's statutory duty to approve commission rates
64
and the concept of competition.6 5 The statute protected securities in-
vestors from paying unfair commission rates to brokers. 6 Absent
statutory approval, the SEC rate-fixing practices constituted antitrust
violations.67 The Court, applying Silver, found that the antitrust laws
prevented the statute from achieving its goal.6 Premised on Silver's
recognition of pervasive SEC authority,69 the Gordon Court also held
that the SEC could not exercise its delegated power without protec-
tion from antitrust scrutiny.7 ° The statute's explicit rate-fixing provi-
sion not only protected the NYSE, but also distinguished this case
from Silver, allowing the Court to grant immunity.
71
The Supreme Court immediately applied the Gordon analysis in
evaluating the quality and pervasiveness of agency power. In United
States v. National Association of Securities Dealers,72 plaintiff chal-
lenged the validity of certain restrictive mutual fund agreements
73
with respect to antitrust laws.' 4 Finding no way to reconcile the stat-
ute's authority with antitrust laws, the Court looked to the SEC's
changed over the past 40 years, the SEC still retained its oversight responsibility in
the particular area. Id. at 666-82.
64. Id. at 690.
65. Id. See also S. RP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72, 98, re rintedin [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 179, 249-50 & 276.
66. 422 U.S. at 666-67. The SEC approves commission rates set by the stock ex-
changes. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 19(b), 48 Stat. 898 (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. § 78s (b) (1976)).
67. 422 U.S. at 683.
68. Id. at 691.
69. Id. at 684.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Id. In practice the SEC never exercised this power to abolish or approve the
commission rates. In fact, the SEC relinquished its power to fix rates to the stock
exchanges before the Gordon case. See Antitrust and Regulated Industries, supra note
30, at 764-65. Numerous writers have criticized Gordon for this reason. See e.g. Shu-
man, supra note 27, at 27.
72. 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (decided the same day as Gordon).
73. Id. at 701-04. The agreements, subject to SEC regulatory control pursuant to
the Investment Company Act of 1940, Ch. 686, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976)), required dealers to sell mutual fund shares to
certain buyers at specific price levels. The agreements also permited dealers to attach
restrictions to the shares they sold, as long as those restrictions did not conflict with
SEC regulations. 422 U.S. at 722-30.
74. Id. at 701-04.
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broad regulatory authority." The Court also considered the past
cases construing SEC statutes in light of the legislative history.76 The
Court held that although the statute contained no expression of im-
munity, Congress intended to imply the exemption; no other interpre-
tation would accommodate both the SEC mandate and antitrust
laws.77
Following the principles developed in the previous regulated in-
dustries cases,7" the Supreme Court applied the two-part analysis in
National Gerimedical. The Court determined that the statute,
NHPRDA,79 implies no antitrust immunity for Blue Cross' voluntary
enforcement of its provisions."0 The Court did not find direct conflict
between NHPRDA and antitrust laws.8" Rather, the Court's legisla-
tive analysis indicated that NHPRDA's overall purpose, as amended
in 1979, included special emphasis on competition. 2 Blue Cross' un-
solicited conduct enforcing the NHPRDA fell entirely beyond the
75. Although the SEC had the authority to prohibit the mutual fund agreements,
it never exercised that privilege. The Court's finding of conflict therefore relied on the
assumption that conflict would arise in this situation if the SEC exercised its power.
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 152.
76. 422 U.S. at 704-11. The pertinent legislative history is included in H.R. Doc.
No. 279, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1940) (Part III of the Investment Trust Study).
77. Id. at 720-30.
78. See notes 41-77 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2424.
81. Id. at 2422-23.
82. Id. at 2420-21. The Court found little express evidence of congressional con-
cern for competition (and therefore for application of antitrust laws) in the original
NHPRDA legislative history. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7842, 7878-79. Congress established in the
1979 Amendments that retention of competition within the health care industry was a
high priority of the legislation. One of the revised national priorities set out in the
amended version states:
(a)(17) The strengthening of competitive forces in the health services industry
wherever competition and consumer choice can constructively serve .... to ad-
vance the purposes of quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and access.
(b)(2) For health services .... for which competition does not or will not ap-
propriately allocate supply consistent with health systems plans .... health sys-
tems agencies ... should ... allocate the supply of such services.
[b](3) For the health services for which competiton appropriately allocates sup-
ply consistent with health systems plans... health systems agencies ... should
... give priority ... to actions which would strengthen the effect of competition
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realm and purpose of the statute.8 3 The Court easily distinguished
National Gerimedical from National Association of Securities Deal-
ers.8 4 In National Association of Securities Dealers, construction of
the statute required a finding of immunity. In National Gerimedical,
on the other hand, implying immunity would misinterpret the statute.
The Court in National Gerimedical also distinguished Gordon be-
cause the SEC statute in Gordon included specific authority to regu-
late the action in question."5
The Court's analysis of Blue Cross' relationship to the statute bears
a distinct similarity to Silver. The local/state health planning agen-
cies 6 established by NHPRDA recommend or require specific health
industry members to perform certain activities.8 7 Blue Cross, be-
cause of its status as a private commercial insurer was not directly
within the scope of NHPRDA regulation. 8 Blue Cross' position
outside the statute resembles that of the non-NYSE member broker
in Silver. 9 Although the Court denied immunity in both National
Gerimedical and Silver,9" it found a more compelling basis for denial
Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 300
k-2(a)(17), (b)(2) & (3) (Supp. III 1979) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 300 k-2 (1974)).
The NHPRDA encourages HSAs to utilize private members of the health industry
in implementing the health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(c)(1) (1976). However, the Act
never directs or even authorizes private, third-party payors to include HSA recom-
mendations in their reimbursement schemes. Furthermore, the statute never suggests
that HSAs and private insurers must cooperate in order to carry out the purpose of
the Act. Miller, supra note 5, at 890-91.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2422-23. See also notes 16 & 19 supra.
84. Id. at 2421-22.
85. Id. at 2421-22.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-2, 300m-2(a) (1976). For a description of the state and local
health planning agencies, see note 19 supra.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3) (1976). The members of the health industry include:
1) providers of health care; 2) health care institutions; 3) health care insurers;
4) health professional schools; and 5) allied health professionals. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-
l(b)(3)(c)(ii) (Supp III 1979).
88. 101 S. Ct. at 2422 n.14. Each scheme of government regulation reaches only
selected portions of the industry. This phenonmenon has resulted in a fragmented
scheme of regulations throughout the industry. Weiner, Health Care Policy and Poll-
tics: Does the Past Tell Us Anything About the Future?, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 335
(1980). The health planning legislation, NHPRDA, does not have any direct or im-
plied regulatory impact on private health insurers such as Blue Cross. Miller, supra
note 5, at 890-91.
89. Brief for Petitioner at 35, National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology
Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 101 S. Ct. 2415 (1981).
90. See note 42 supra.
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in National Gerimedical. Blue Cross, unlike the plaintiff in Silver,9 1
fell beyond even the broadest class of industry-members regulated by
the statute.
In considering the voluntary nature of Blue Cross' actions, the Na-
tional Gerimedical Court relied on Otter Tail.92 The Court examined
Blue Cross' distant link to the health planning regulatory scheme.93
Based on this tenuous connection, as well as a finding of no relevant
congressional intent, the Court concluded that the Blue Cross policy
resulted solely from a voluntary business decision subject to antitrust
scrutiny.94 Consistent with Otter Tail, the unilateral and non-
mandatory enforcement of the statute did not provide convincing jus-
tification for granting immunity.95
The Supreme Court's reversal of the lower court decisions upheld
the purpose of antitrust laws by preserving the narrow application of
the implied immunity doctrine.96 Not only would the lower court
opinions have provided no guidance for the health industry,9 7 but all
91. See notes 41-50 and accompanying text supra.
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2422.
93. Id.
94. Id. But see id. at 2423-24 n. 18. Had this case involved a regulated party vol-
untarily cooperating with a specific HSA plan under NHPRDA, the Court might
have found immunity. .d.
95. Id. at 2422.
96. Id. at 2424. The lower court decisions implied that NHPRDA and antitrust
laws were so incompatible that all health planning actions should be immune from
antitrust scrutiny. Id. Although no antitrust violation may exist in the case of coop-
eration between an HSA and a private insurer, "to foreclose the inquiry conflicts with
the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to implied repeal." Miller, supra note 5, at
891.
97. National Gerimedical provides the first meaningful guidance for dealing with
conflict in the context of health planning. Huron Valley Hospital v. City of Pontiac,
466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979) discussed at note 28 supra, considered the issue
of antitrust immunity as applied to health planning. Huron carries little weight be-
cause NHPRDA (1974 version) expresses nothing about antitrust implications. See
note 82 supra. Furthermore, Congress enacted the 1979 Amendments two months
after Huron. See Miller, supra note 5, at 889-90. The lower courts in National Ger-
iOedical relied on Huron and thereby extended blanket immunity for all actions
taken to implement NHPRDA. Walbolt & Pankau, supra note 5, at 391-92.
Cf City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hospital Association, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded 435 U.S. 992, (1978). Plaintiff, City of Fairfax, sued a county
hospital association that attempted to lease a hospital and thereby create a monopoly
of the city's only two hospitals. Plaintiff fied the suit based on the fact that defendant
never received the county's approval for the hospital. The county possessed responsi-
bility over reviewing new hospital plans, but lacked authority to veto plans it did not
favor. The court held that "the mere fact that a body is 'a state agency for some
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regulated industries could have justified implied immunity claims on
significantly less appropriate grounds.9" Finally, National Gerimed-
cal represents no major change in the scope of immunity for regu-
lated industries. In an era of rampant deregulation,99 however, it
limited purposes' does not make it an 'antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticom-
petitive practices.'" 562 F.2d at 284-85 (emphasis in original). Although this case
involves a state action exemption, an analogy to National Gerimedical can be useful.
Fai ax dealt with an informal local health planning body under loose state supervi-
sion. Neither federal nor state law required the particular conduct in question. At the
same time, lack of the health planning action would not create a repugnancy to the
state and federal health planning programs. M. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 61-63.
98. Conferring implied immunity in this instance would relax the standards estab-
lished in the case law, allowing the doctrine to apply on a broad basis without consid-
ering whether immunity is essential in the particular instance. While NHPRDA does
not constitute the same type of all-pervasive regulatory scheme that controls the utili-
ties or securities transactions, it represents one of the most comprehensive programs
in the health industry. See National Health Planning, supra note 86, at 511.
In other industrial contexts the courts have specifically avoided conferring blanket
antitrust immunity. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S.
726, 733 (1973) (shipping); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-
74 (1973) (electric power industry); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,
383 U.S. 213, 217-19 (1966) (shipping); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963) (airlines); California v. Federal Power Comm'n., 369
U.S. 482,489 (1961) (natural gas industry); MCI Communications v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (telecommunications industry).
99. The Reagan Administration intends to phase out health planning under
NHPRDA over a two year period. At the same time, the Administration has pro-
posed legislation which over a two year period would phase in a pro-competition
program. A new bill, S.139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), attempts to increase compe-
tition in the health care industry and, as a result, prevent costs from rising. The Ad-
ministration hopes the new program accomplishes these objectives by instituting
measures to discourage the unnecessary use of health services. CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP., Sept. 5, 1981, at 1672; CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., March 7, 1981, at 415-19.
The debate between advocates of health industry regulation and supporters of free
competition has existed since the early seventies. After the passage of NHPRDA, the
industry seemed destined for increasing regulatory pressure. See Rosoff, supra note
27, at 446; Comment, Health Care Regulation in Cali/ornia: CONstitutional?, 11 PAC.
L.J. 845, 845-46 (1980). More recently, regulation in all industries has come under
general attack as a barrier to free competition, thus inspiring the recent trends toward
deregulation. See Antitrust and Regulated Industries, supra note 30, at 755. See gener-
ally Statement ofJoe Sims, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 943 (1979) (criticizing regula-
tion as an ineffective substitute for competition; evaluating role of antitrust
immunities). As deregulation becomes more widespread, the private sector will be-
come more involved in decision-making. The role played by antitrust law must be
adjusted to suit this new environment. See Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and
Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 2 (1980).
Professor Clark C. Havighurst and others have also criticized health planning and
regulation as an ineffective means of solving the problems of the health industry. See
Havighurst & Hackbarth, Competition and Health Care, Planningfor Deregulation,
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provides timely advice for defining a balance between regulatory au-
thority and voluntary public decision-making.
Susan N. Chernoff
REGULATION, 39 (May/June 1980); D. SALKEVER & T. BicE, HOSPITAL CERTIFI-
CATE-OF-NEED CONTROLS, 82-83 (1979); Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions and the Marketfor Health Services, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 716, 717 (1970);
Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery System, 9
CuM. L. REV. 685, 719 (1979); See also Canarie, Maldistributed Health Care Services:
Restructuring the Current Regulatory System, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 407, 411-13 (1980).
While Havighurst favors competitive deregulatory means of dealing with the health
industry, other experts in the field favor health planning in the context of a new regu-
latory scheme. The latter approach fashions an active role for consumers, hospitals
and insurers within a new regulatory philosophy which strives to encourage participa-
tion from both public and private sectors. See Weiner, Governmental Regulation of
Health Care 4 Response to Some Criticisms Voiced by Proponents of a "'Free Mar-
ket", 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 26-30 (1978); Weiner, Health Care Policy & Politics: Does
the Past Tell Us Anything About the Future?, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 338-41 (1980).
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